Approved For Release 2001/08/10: CIA-RDP78-04718A001700030015-6

APR 8 1955

Till

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White

THROUGH

: Mr. Lloyd

25X1A9a SUBJECT

: Comments on

Paper on Agency Manpower

Control System

25X1A9a 1. Initially states, "This paper deals with principle only. To do otherwise at this stage will bog the whole matter down." In conversation he amplified this by saying that he was giving the paper to you in such a fashion that you could buy as much of it as you wished at this time, in whole or in part. He has approached the problem of simplified manpower controls from two avenues:

a. A critique of the present system of T/0 and ceiling concepts.

b. Personnel Accounting.

- 2. In Part I, John criticizes a lack of uniformity in interpretation of the terms "T/O" and "ceiling," pointing out that they frequently do not reflect current work burdens; i.e., lack of uniformity in slotting military against T/O positions and his contention that present controls of T/O's and ceilings are an administrative bottleneck of huge proportions. I think that his most telling criticism against T/O structure is his statement that it is an appropriate importation from the Armed Forces, "where its design is to serve basic small units of fixed status with growth or expansion therefrom being merely a matter of multiplication of units."
- 3. John establishes a case for the fact that an intelligence organization by definition requires an instrument more flexible than the present T/O structure; one responsive to the rapid changes in emphasis brought on by international developments; one that could adapt itself efficiently to changes in missions assigned CIA by NSC wherein whole functional or country programs may mushroom or disappear overnight. He points out the archaic nature of T/Os by citing the combined headquarters and field T/O of DD/P/FE where unoccupied positions exist, and within which structure employees can be maneuvered for grade purposes. His view, central throughout this paper, is that we need a substitute for T/O and ceiling that is "an accurate transciption of mission in terms of personnel." To that end he proposes:

25X9A2

Approved For Release 2001/08/10 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001700030015-6

- a. Drop use of the terms "T/O" and "ceiling" and the concept of ceiling as an instrument of control at the operational level, substituting therefor "staffing pattern," which he defines generally as more people to do current "work burdens." "Work burden" he then defines as current tasks stemming from functional responsibilities other than of an emergency nature.
- b. He proposes "ceiling" only at the Agency level with control resting in the DCI. Ceiling as now employed, John calls a "numbers game."
- c. That processing of requests for staffing pattern modifications arising from changes in work burdens be accelerated.
- In order to make staffing patterns flexible he advances a proposal that there be a reasonable delegation of authority to transfer positions and personnel as mission changes within the areas of jurisdiction of: Deputy Directors (and to their immediate subordinate echelons), Senior Representatives, Chiefs of Mission, and Chiefs of Station. It is one thing to agree in principle with this delegation and another to make it work. From a classification and actual Personnel-Management point of view, the results could be awesome. This I feel despite John's statement that the power to make these changes would not apply in cases where the basic organizational structure was modified or where functions were changed. I personally doubt that in an Agency where specialization is receing increased attention and where people become progressively more identified as specialists the longer they gain experience in one central line of endeavor, that we can assume from them an equal performance in other areas, except within fairly limited boundaries. Yet, this is where the Office of Training might come in, were it not for the fact that the entire reasoning behind John's argument is "staffing pattern" is needed to more speedily reflect changes in mission, workload, etc. Training cannot be taken or assimilated without time, and, in John's reasoning, time is precious.
- 4. He also suggests that military be brought into the staffing pattern directly and not be kept set apart on any personnel accounting system. He then proposes that his staff review staffing patterns throughout the Agency annually to see that the proper relationship to work burden is maintained. My own feeling is that this would be a staggering job, requiring a larger staff by far than that which he now has, in addition to which, there are the usual problems of gaining access to the type of information he would need upon which to base accurate judgment of this sort.

Approved For Release 2001/08/10: CIA-RDP78-04718A001700030015-6

- 5. In Part II, John attacks the In and Out Casual problems and related issues under the heading of "Personnel Accounting." I think he makes a very good critical thesis that today's system of mixed-up relationships between Headquarters and Field, where people are physically in one place but charged to another, can only confuse ourselves, pervert the proposal for which unvouchered funds were authorized, and lead to undue criticism from outside. Briefly, he says that it is time we recognized that there is a "third category" outside that of Headquarters (vouchered) and Field (unvouchered). Again, he relates this to the problem of work burden, saying that we must separate employees cleanly by their location and by whether or not they contribute directly to the reduction of the current work burdens. For example, anyone in training, either initial or supplemental, is not contributing to reducing the "work burden." In addition to those taking initial training he would include in this "Third Category" those persons in the process of being PCSd, rotated, on extended leave, career development training prior to overseas, or external training as being non-contributors to the immediate work burden and, therefore, not to be charged against it or against staffing pattern.
- 6. What it looks like to me is that John is saying that we should divide our manpower into three groups: Departmental, Field, and "Third Force." I believe that this concept is sound, somewhat analagous to "replacement depots" or "training commands" where the mission is neither connected with continental defense (Departmental) or overseas striking force (Field). It is the "casual battalion" or "holding force" concept, where essentially non-productive (from a fighting point of view) tasks were performed, where retraining was accomplished or where the wounds of war were healed. John proposes that this "Third Force" be controlled through funds and administrative scrutiny and its members, in a manner consistent with covert operations, be paid as exclusively from vouchered funds as possible.

SUMMARY: It seems to me that there are many good points in this paper. It is difficult to argue on behalf of the T/O system when confronted with reasoning of the type has produced here. There are a good many chinks, of course, in this proposal which I assume can be filled in once he has established your willingness to back him in accordance with these principles which he has advocated. My most serious doubt centers around the question of delegating authority to the levels proposed herein to reassign, relocate, or redirect employees in conformity with current mission. I have the inescapable feeling that the danger here lies in the fact that changes in work burden seldom announce themselves before they occur. It is more usual that an increase is so gradual as to be almost invisible or that a decrease is measured in the same way. Therefore, I doubt seriously that very many people can accurately measure

25X1A9a

Approved For Release 2001/08/10: CIA-RDP78-04718A001700030015-6

25X1A9a

either the needs of their office or the limitations of the people who work for them with any accuracy from day to day. If we go too far in direction we may produce such fluidity that there is chaos. That there is a need for an improved system of personnel accounting, no one can deny. In the light of that need I feel that John's proposal about a Third Force is an acceptable one, at least, as a point from which departure can be made for supporting proposals.



25X1A9a